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Abstract	  
	  
Istanbul’s	  place	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  system	  has	  become	  regionally	  prominent	  as	  Turkey	  has	  
opened	  up	  to	  a	  globalizing	  economy	  since	  the	  1980s.	  The	  AKP	  government	  now	  wants	  to	  not	  only	  
entrench	  Istanbul’s	  status	  as	  an	  attractive	  emerging	  market	  but	  also	  make	  Istanbul	  a	  globally	  
important	  financial	  services	  centre.	  For	  this,	  a	  project	  of	  reforms,	  initiatives	  and	  building	  work	  has	  
recently	  been	  put	  in	  motion.	  The	  article	  contextualizes	  this	  project	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  politics,	  
economy	  and	  markets	  nexus	  in	  Turkey	  since	  the	  1980s.	  It	  then	  reviews	  the	  project’s	  progress	  in	  
various	  domains	  and	  comments	  on	  its	  future	  by	  taking	  cues	  from	  recent	  political	  turns	  in	  the	  AKP	  
leadership	  concerning	  economy	  and	  financial	  system.	  	  
	  
Introduction	  
This	  article	  discusses	  recent	  Turkish	  economic	  and	  financial	  history	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  an	  ongoing	  
initiative	  to	  turn	  Istanbul	  into	  an	  international	  financial	  centre.	  The	  Istanbul	  Financial	  Center	  project	  
(IFCP)	  is	  a	  state	  approved	  and	  run	  project	  since	  2009	  that	  aims	  to	  turn	  Istanbul	  into	  first	  a	  regional	  
and	  then	  global	  financial	  centre.1	  Currently,	  the	  IFCP	  involves	  ongoing	  building	  work	  in	  Istanbul’s	  
Atasehir	  district.	  Several	  state-­‐owned	  financial	  organisations	  and	  regulatory	  institutions	  plan	  to	  
move	  their	  Ankara-­‐based	  headquarters	  to	  the	  IFCP	  campus.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  the	  project,	  which	  
according	  to	  the	  IFCP’s	  website	  involves	  substantial	  reforms	  and	  initiatives	  in	  legal,	  regulatory,	  
technological,	  human	  resources	  and	  other	  domains	  has	  made	  as	  much	  progress	  as	  the	  building	  work	  
in	  Atasehir.	  	  
	  
A	  careful	  examination	  of	  the	  IFCP	  website	  gives	  the	  reader	  the	  impression	  that	  Istanbul’s	  
transformation	  into	  a	  global	  financial	  centre	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  possible	  by	  state	  sponsorship	  and	  
intervention.	  The	  IFCP	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  competition	  from	  already	  strong	  regional	  and	  global	  
alternatives	  to	  Istanbul	  and	  Istanbul’s	  recent	  fall	  from	  the	  42nd	  to	  the	  44th	  place	  in	  the	  Global	  
Financial	  Centre	  Index	  (GFCI)	  of	  82	  centres.2	  This	  index	  is	  based	  firstly	  on	  the	  standings	  of	  all	  82	  
centres	  in	  many	  of	  the	  domains	  the	  IFCP	  set	  to	  make	  progress,	  and	  secondly	  on	  global	  finance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  IFCP,	  “Istanbul	  International	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  Center,”	  no	  date,	  available	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  http://www.ifcturkey.com/istanbul-­‐international-­‐
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  ,	  last	  accessed	  19	  Sep.	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2	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  available	  at	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professionals’	  rankings	  of	  these	  centres.	  The	  index	  currently	  places	  Istanbul	  into	  the	  transnational	  
and	  diversified	  financial	  centres	  category	  and	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  ten	  Eastern	  European	  and	  Central	  
Asian	  centres	  above	  centres	  like	  Almaty,	  Moscow,	  Prague,	  	  and	  Athens.3	  	  
	  
The	  article	  argues	  that	  the	  current	  state	  of	  politics,	  economy	  and	  financial	  markets	  in	  Turkey	  	  makes	  
the	  IFCP,	  like	  other	  so	  called	  “crazy	  projects”	  of	  the	  ruling	  AKP,	  a	  project	  that	  is	  in	  the	  short	  and	  
medium	  term	  poised	  to	  be	  conspicuous	  mainly	  in	  physical	  presence	  and	  relevant	  at	  best	  to	  Turkey’s	  
eastern	  hinterland,	  including	  the	  Middle	  East.	  The	  article	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  first	  section,	  
a	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  Turkish	  politics,	  economy	  and	  financial	  markets	  in	  recent	  decades	  is	  attempted	  
to	  contextualize	  the	  IFCP.	  The	  subsequent	  section	  presents	  insights	  from	  local	  and	  international	  
actors	  in	  the	  Turkish	  financial	  system.	  These	  insights	  provide	  another	  backdrop	  for	  future	  
trajectories	  for	  the	  IFCP.	  The	  article	  concludes	  with	  observations	  about	  the	  current	  state	  of	  progress	  
in	  the	  IFCP	  and	  what	  these	  signal	  for	  the	  future	  in	  light	  of	  the	  existing	  political	  and	  economic	  
dynamics	  in	  Turkey	  and	  the	  world.	  	  
	  
Politics,	  economy	  and	  markets	  since	  the	  1980s	  	  
The	  Turkish	  economy	  in	  recent	  decades	  has	  gone	  through	  some	  dramatic	  transformations.	  The	  
import	  substitution	  model	  of	  the	  late	  1950s	  had	  helped	  Turkey’s	  industrial	  base	  into	  broader	  
production	  and	  consumption	  goods.	  In	  the	  early	  1980s,	  the	  country	  entered	  the	  gradual	  
liberalization	  of	  consumer,	  production	  and	  financial	  markets	  (Kazgan	  2005).	  This	  liberalization	  era,	  
which	  has	  helped	  Turkey	  become	  an	  important	  regional	  economic	  hub,	  unfortunately	  started	  on	  the	  
back	  of	  major	  economic	  and	  political	  crises	  in	  Turkey	  in	  the	  late	  1970s.	  These	  crises	  were	  taken	  as	  a	  
justification	  by	  the	  country’s	  military	  for	  yet	  another	  coup	  in	  1980.	  With	  the	  military’s	  crushing	  
power	  over	  democratic	  processes,	  the	  early	  liberalization	  reforms,	  devised	  by	  technocrats	  were	  
passed	  unopposed	  (Alper	  and	  Onis	  2003).	  The	  introduction	  of	  a	  capital	  markets	  code	  in	  those	  years	  
and	  the	  subsequent	  opening	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Stock	  Exchange	  (ISE)	  in	  December	  1985	  were	  major	  
steps	  to	  nurture	  a	  market	  based	  people’s	  capitalism	  in	  the	  country	  (Kazgan	  1995;	  Denizer	  et	  al.,	  
2000).	  Privatization	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  were	  initiated	  with	  selling	  off	  shares	  in	  the	  nascent	  
ISE.	  	  In	  1989,	  the	  Turkish	  capital	  account	  was	  liberalized	  and	  foreign	  investors	  were	  allowed	  to	  invest	  
freely	  in	  the	  country’s	  assets.	  	  
	  
The	  entry	  of	  foreign	  investors	  to	  the	  ISE	  in	  the	  1990s	  was	  characterized	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  financial	  
adventure	  on	  the	  part	  of	  those	  several	  dozen	  pioneering	  investors	  (Yildirim	  1995;	  Chambers	  2006).	  
The	  main	  reason	  behind	  this	  characterization	  is	  that	  the	  Turkish	  economy	  and	  thus	  markets	  were	  
prone	  to	  extreme	  gains	  and	  losses.	  The	  underlying	  reasons	  of	  these	  volatilities	  were	  firstly	  Turkish	  
savers’	  unwavering	  interest	  	  in	  the	  stock	  market,	  which	  led	  to	  sustained	  rallies	  owing	  to	  lack	  of	  
supply	  (Yildirim	  1995).	  Secondly	  and	  more	  importantly,	  such	  major	  rallies	  were	  reversed	  	  by	  major	  
significant	  political	  and	  economic	  events	  such	  as	  the	  Gulf	  War	  in	  1991,	  the	  1994	  Turkish	  currency	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  index	  is	  compiled	  by	  Z/Yen	  Group	  and	  sponsored	  by	  Qatari	  Financial	  Authority.	  See	  
http://www.zyen.com/research/gfci.html	  for	  details	  and	  latest	  index	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crisis,	  and	  the	  contagion	  of	  the	  1997/8	  East	  Asian	  and	  Russian	  crises	  to	  Turkey.	  The	  defining	  feature	  
of	  the	  Turkish	  economy	  that	  underpinned	  these	  homegrown	  or	  imported	  crises	  was	  a	  profligate	  
state	  that	  drove	  the	  Turkish	  fiscal	  and	  current	  account	  deficits.	  These	  twin	  deficits	  made	  the	  country	  
very	  dependent	  on	  foreign	  capital,	  mainly	  brought	  to	  the	  country	  by	  Turkish	  public	  and	  private	  
banks.	  	  Any	  sudden	  reversals	  of	  these	  capital	  flows	  owing	  to	  local	  or	  international	  events	  meant	  runs	  
on	  the	  Turkish	  currency,	  balance	  of	  payments	  issues,	  and	  bank	  failures	  (Alper	  and	  Onis,	  2003;	  Alper	  
and	  Yilmaz,	  2004).	  	  
	  
Erturk	  (2003)	  describes	  the	  1990s	  as	  an	  era	  of	  coupon	  capitalism	  in	  which	  successive	  Turkish	  
governments	  financed	  their	  profligate	  expenditure	  by	  crowding	  out	  private	  actors	  in	  the	  Turkish	  
financial	  markets.	  Another	  consequence	  of	  this	  type	  of	  spending	  was	  very	  high	  inflation	  levels,	  which	  
bordered	  three	  digits.	  The	  IMF	  credit	  and	  reform	  programmes	  in	  the	  1990s	  kept	  the	  Turkish	  
economy	  solvent	  but	  a	  durable	  structural	  change	  never	  seemed	  to	  be	  achieved	  as	  proven	  by	  yet	  
another	  homegrown	  financial	  crisis	  in	  2001.	  While	  the	  1990s’	  macroeconomic	  environment	  was	  
characterized	  by	  volatility,	  the	  bourgeoning	  financial	  markets	  suffered	  also	  from	  gaps	  in	  regulatory	  
environment,	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  investor	  rights	  and	  institutional	  actors’	  accountability	  (Yildirim	  
1995).	  Regulatory	  weaknesses	  in	  these	  areas	  coupled	  with	  lack	  of	  robust	  monitoring	  and	  accounting	  
technologies	  led	  to	  financial	  losses	  for	  investors.	  The	  market	  regulators	  and	  legislators	  had	  gradually	  
managed	  to	  address	  these	  gaps	  by	  introducing	  new	  technologies	  and	  regulatory	  standards.	  By	  the	  
late	  1990s,	  the	  ISE	  for	  instance	  enjoyed	  real	  time	  digital	  technologies	  for	  price	  discovery	  and	  
dissemination,	  custodian	  services,	  and	  market	  surveillance.	  Despite	  these	  improvements,	  the	  ISE	  
remained	  a	  market	  that	  was	  driven	  by	  local	  market	  actors	  and	  agendas	  (Tarim	  2010).	  Foreign	  
investors	  remained	  rather	  insignificant	  in	  numbers	  and	  ownership,	  and	  strategically	  managed	  their	  
exposure	  to	  the	  ISE	  depending	  on	  major	  local	  and	  international	  crises	  (Chambers	  2006).	  	  
	  
Despite	  the	  turmoil	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  and	  Russian	  crises,	  and	  the	  Turkish	  military’s	  toppling	  of	  the	  
Islamic	  leaning	  coalition	  government	  by	  memorandum	  in	  1998,	  the	  1990s	  ended	  on	  a	  high	  note	  in	  
terms	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  stability.	  The	  IMF’s	  structural	  reform	  programme	  stipulated	  a	  fixed	  
currency	  regime	  and	  gradual	  exit	  of	  the	  state	  from	  economy	  and	  financial	  markets.	  The	  programme	  
started	  to	  reduce	  interest	  rates	  and	  inflation,	  and	  led	  to	  another	  boom	  in	  the	  Turkish	  investor	  
numbers	  in	  the	  rallying	  markets	  (Akyurek,	  2006;	  Capoglu,	  2004;	  Tarim	  2010).	  However,	  
disagreements	  within	  the	  centre	  left	  and	  centre	  right	  coalition	  and	  slow	  down	  in	  the	  reform	  process	  
underpinned	  yet	  another	  sudden	  capital	  reversal.	  This	  in	  2001	  paved	  way	  to	  the	  biggest	  economic	  
and	  financial	  meltdown	  of	  the	  republican	  history	  (Capoglu	  2004).	  The	  coalition	  government	  brought	  
in	  Mr	  Kemal	  Dervis,	  a	  renowned	  international	  economist	  as	  the	  minister	  in	  charge	  of	  economy	  
(Akyurek	  2006).	  Facing	  insolvency	  as	  a	  country	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  annihilation	  as	  political	  parties	  
on	  the	  other,	  the	  coalition	  partners	  decided	  to	  press	  ahead	  with	  very	  comprehensive	  and	  painful	  
structural	  reforms	  supervised	  by	  the	  IMF.	  
	  
The	  rise	  of	  AKP	  as	  a	  new	  political	  party	  happened	  in	  this	  post-­‐crisis	  and	  painful	  structural	  reform	  
contexts.	  A	  few	  months	  after	  Mr	  Dervis’	  appointment,	  the	  Turkish	  economy	  and	  the	  now	  free	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floating	  currency	  started	  to	  stabilize.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  coalition	  parties	  went	  for	  a	  snap	  election	  in	  
November	  2002.	  The	  AKP	  cadres	  that	  contested	  the	  elections	  consisted	  of	  younger	  Islamist	  
politicians	  who	  broke	  away	  from	  their	  toppled	  and	  banned	  Islamist	  parties	  of	  the	  late	  1990s.	  They	  
were	  eager	  to	  show	  their	  moderate	  and	  mainstream	  political	  views.	  Such	  eagerness	  was	  
understandable	  as	  the	  secular	  establishment	  in	  Turkey,	  foremost	  member	  of	  it	  being	  the	  Turkish	  
army	  was	  still	  very	  suspicious	  of	  any	  Islamist	  political	  movement,	  not	  to	  mention	  legitimate	  Islamist	  
political	  parties	  (Dagi	  2008).	  AKP	  won	  a	  landslide	  victory	  in	  the	  2002	  elections	  and	  oversaw	  the	  
electoral	  ousting	  of	  the	  coalition	  parties	  from	  the	  parliament.	  The	  most	  peculiar	  aspect	  of	  this	  
victory	  was	  that	  AKP	  continued	  the	  structural	  reform	  programme	  of	  Mr	  Dervis	  and	  the	  IMF	  (Dufour	  
and	  Orhangazi	  2009).	  	  
	  
This	  was	  the	  first	  practical	  sign	  of	  AKP’s	  break	  away	  from	  their	  Islamist	  roots.	  The	  structural	  reforms	  
started	  to	  bear	  fruit	  in	  the	  form	  of	  falling	  interest	  and	  inflation	  rates,	  increasing	  economic	  growth,	  
and	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  direct	  and	  portfolio	  investments	  to	  the	  country	  (Dufour	  and	  Orhangazi	  2009).	  	  
The	  loose	  monetary	  policies	  of	  developed	  countries	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  millennium	  to	  address	  
the	  post	  dot.com	  crash	  and	  9/11	  shocks	  also	  underpinned	  these	  capital	  flows.	  Maybe	  the	  most	  
significant	  and	  unlikely	  fruit	  of	  these	  reforms	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  Turkish	  economy	  and	  politics	  was	  
the	  start	  of	  the	  EU	  accession	  negotiations	  in	  2005.	  Unlikely	  because	  AKP’s	  predecessors	  always	  
labelled	  the	  EU	  a	  “Christian	  club”,	  something	  Turkey,	  a	  Muslim	  country	  should	  never	  be	  part	  of	  (Dagi	  
2008).	  	  	  This	  new	  phase	  also	  signalled	  gradual	  convergence	  of	  the	  Turkish	  economic	  and	  political	  
standards	  towards	  those	  of	  European	  Union	  members.	  Such	  a	  convergence	  process	  was	  something	  
moderate	  Turkish	  political	  parties	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  could	  not	  meaningfully	  
start	  in	  previous	  decades	  (Patton	  2007).	  	  
	  
While	  Turkey	  seemed	  to	  be	  firmly	  on	  the	  convergence	  path,	  AKP	  also	  consolidated	  its	  power	  by	  
successive	  local	  and	  national	  election	  victories.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  secular	  establishment,	  still	  
suspicious	  of	  the	  ruling	  party’s	  Islamist	  roots	  seemed	  intent	  on	  undermining	  the	  party	  by	  judicial	  and	  
otherwise	  moves,	  which	  included	  anti-­‐government	  rallies	  and	  alleged	  conspiracies	  to	  topple	  it.	  
Despite	  the	  rising	  secular	  parliamentary	  and	  otherwise	  opposition	  to	  the	  AKP	  rule	  in	  2007	  and	  2008,	  
the	  party	  managed	  to	  survive	  the	  biggest	  threats-­‐namely,	  	  the	  presidential	  election	  and	  the	  so-­‐called	  
e-­‐memorandum	  confrontation	  in	  2007,	  and	  the	  Constitutional	  Court’s	  party	  ban	  case	  in	  2008	  
(Gumuscu	  and	  Sert	  2010;	  Atay	  2013).	  During	  these	  secular	  challenges,	  AKP	  enjoyed	  the	  widespread	  
support	  of	  Western	  governments,	  intellectuals	  and	  press	  because	  of	  their	  perception	  of	  a	  
democratic	  deficit	  in	  Turkey	  caused	  by	  an	  ever	  present	  military	  tutelage.	  Interestingly,	  AKP,	  a	  party	  
with	  Islamist	  roots	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  real	  democratizing	  and	  normalizing	  force	  in	  a	  secular	  country	  like	  
Turkey	  (Haynes	  2009;	  Gunter	  and	  Yavuz	  2007).	  	  	  
	  
While	  AKP	  survived	  these	  challenges,	  the	  Turkish	  economy	  and	  markets	  remained	  rather	  strong.	  The	  
interest	  of	  foreign	  investors	  in	  Turkish	  assets	  underpinned	  the	  ongoing	  privatizations	  and	  soaring	  
foreign	  ownership	  figures	  in	  the	  ISE	  stocks,	  which	  reached	  72	  %	  in	  2008	  (Tarim	  2010).	  Nevertheless,	  
the	  2008	  global	  crisis	  adversely	  affected	  the	  Turkish	  economic	  growth.	  It	  also	  reduced	  AKP’s	  share	  in	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votes	  in	  the	  2009	  elections	  (Gumuscu	  and	  Sert	  2010).	  The	  economic	  growth	  however	  recovered	  with	  
a	  spectacular	  rate	  of	  9	  %	  in	  2010	  and	  2011	  but	  slowed	  down	  to	  less	  than	  3	  %	  in	  2013	  on	  the	  back	  of	  
measures	  to	  control	  the	  overheating	  economy	  and	  reduce	  the	  ballooning	  current	  account	  deficit.4	  In	  
the	  meantime,	  the	  AKP	  government	  in	  cooperation	  with	  its	  allies	  in	  the	  Turkish	  bureaucracy,	  
judiciary	  and	  media	  started	  a	  major	  crackdown	  on	  a	  large	  number	  of	  figures	  from	  the	  military,	  
media,	  civil	  society	  and	  business	  allegedly	  conspiring	  to	  overthrow	  the	  AKP	  government	  since	  2002	  
(Gumuscu	  and	  Sert	  2010;	  Gursoy	  2012).	  The	  court	  cases	  brought	  against	  these	  figures	  and	  the	  
constitutional	  and	  judiciary	  reforms	  were	  mostly	  positively	  welcomed	  among	  the	  liberal	  Turkish	  
circles	  and	  in	  the	  West	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  further	  normalization	  in	  a	  post-­‐military	  tutelage	  era	  in	  Turkey.	  	  	  
	  
As	  successive	  AKP	  governments	  and	  Mr	  Recep	  Tayyip	  Erdogan	  as	  the	  prime	  minister	  consolidated	  
their	  electoral	  and	  legislative	  power,	  they	  also	  enjoyed	  a	  peculiarly	  loose	  global	  monetary	  policy	  
environment	  after	  the	  2008	  global	  crisis.	  This	  was	  similar	  to	  AKP’s	  early	  years	  in	  power	  in	  the	  post	  
dot.com	  and	  9/11	  shocks.	  This	  time,	  however,	  the	  peculiarity	  came	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  not	  just	  
close-­‐to-­‐zero	  monetary	  policy	  rates.	  Major	  central	  banks	  such	  as	  the	  FED	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  
pumped	  several	  trillion	  US	  dollars	  into	  their	  economies,	  which	  created	  unprecedented	  global	  credit	  
largesse	  (Fawley	  and	  Neely	  2013).	  These	  government	  funds	  also	  found	  their	  way	  to	  the	  high	  yielding	  
but	  high	  risk	  markets	  like	  Turkey	  (Eichengreen	  and	  Gupta	  2014).	  The	  high	  point	  of	  this	  credit	  largesse	  
and	  relatively	  sound	  Turkish	  economy	  and	  politics	  came	  when	  major	  credit	  rating	  agencies	  upgraded	  
Turkey	  to	  investment	  grade	  status.	  In	  the	  early	  months	  of	  2013,	  the	  spreads	  on	  Turkish	  bonds	  and	  
Turkey’s	  credit	  default	  premiums	  in	  relation	  to	  benchmark	  US	  rates	  reached	  historical	  lows.	  	  
	  
Unsurprisingly,	  several	  grand	  infrastructure	  and	  investment	  projects	  for	  Istanbul	  and	  its	  hinterland	  
emerged	  or	  made	  progress	  in	  this	  global	  credit	  largesse,	  including	  the	  IFCP.	  These	  projects	  also	  
include	  a	  new	  airport	  in	  Istanbul	  that	  would	  have	  the	  highest	  passenger	  capacity	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  
Middle	  East;	  and	  an	  artificial	  water	  way	  west	  of	  the	  Bosporus,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  busiest	  
international	  shipping	  lanes	  in	  the	  world.	  These	  so	  called	  “crazy	  projects”	  by	  AKP	  and	  its	  supporters	  
have	  since	  polarized	  the	  public	  opinion	  in	  Turkey	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  environmental,	  demographic,	  social	  
and	  cultural	  concerns.	  These	  concerns	  and	  concomitant	  legal	  challenges	  have	  been	  addressed	  by	  
AKP	  and	  its	  supporters	  by	  a	  combined	  strategy	  of	  rhetorical	  attacks	  and	  fast-­‐tracking	  projects	  with	  
minimum	  judicial	  overview.	  The	  latter	  has	  been	  possible	  thanks	  to	  AKP’s	  increasing	  control	  over	  
checks	  and	  balances	  on	  its	  executive	  and	  legislative	  power.	  The	  rhetorical	  attacks	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  
are	  broad-­‐brushed	  and	  generally	  characterize	  any	  local	  opposition	  as	  part	  of	  an	  unwavering	  
international	  conspiracy	  against	  the	  AKP	  rule.	  	  
	  
In	  fact,	  the	  crystallisation	  of	  this	  type	  of	  rhetorical	  response	  happened	  around	  the	  Gezi	  Park	  protests	  
in	  May-­‐June	  2013.	  As	  widely	  publicized	  in	  the	  global	  media,	  the	  Gezi	  protests	  started	  after	  another	  
“crazy	  project”-­‐namely,	  the	  restitution	  of	  a	  late	  Ottoman	  era	  building	  in	  one	  of	  the	  few	  remaining	  
green	  spaces	  in	  central	  Istanbul	  was	  initiated.	  Localized	  protests	  by	  green	  activists	  quickly	  turned	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  Economist,	  “Strong	  but	  vulnerable.	  Turkey	  remains	  highly	  exposed	  to	  loss	  of	  confidence	  by	  foreign	  investors”,	  15	  
June	  2013,	  available	  at	  http://www.economist.com/node/21579491/print	  ,	  last	  accessed	  19	  Sep.	  15	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into	  nation-­‐wide	  protests	  against	  AKP	  and	  Mr	  Erdogan.	  Mr	  Erdogan	  and	  his	  close	  allies	  in	  media	  
labelled	  the	  protests	  as	  part	  of	  a	  “failed	  coup”	  orchestrated	  by	  national	  and	  international	  
conspirators	  against	  Mr	  Erdogan	  and	  his	  party.	  	  This	  was	  an	  interesting	  label	  on	  the	  protesters	  as	  
they	  came	  from	  different	  social	  and	  political	  backgrounds	  and	  could	  not	  be	  easily	  linked	  to	  parts	  of	  
the	  secular	  establishment	  that	  were	  implicated	  in	  alleged	  coup	  attempts	  and	  conspiracies	  of	  
previous	  years	  (Gole	  2013;	  Atay	  2013).	  	  	  	  Irrespective	  of	  these	  social	  and	  political	  nuances,	  given	  Mr	  
Erdogan’s	  rhetoric,	  there	  have	  been	  unsurprisingly	  a	  few	  court	  cases	  brought	  against	  protestors.	  
Various	  sentences	  have	  so	  far	  been	  handed	  over	  to	  protestors	  mainly	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  violating	  the	  
code	  on	  protest	  and	  marches.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Taksim	  Solidarity,	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  protest	  
organisers	  have	  been	  acquitted	  from	  much	  more	  serious	  charges	  of	  conspiring	  to	  overthrow	  the	  
government.	  Some	  members	  of	  a	  famous	  football	  fan	  group	  –namely,	  Carsi	  of	  Besiktas	  Gymnasium	  
Club	  are	  nevertheless	  still	  being	  tried	  for	  such	  serious	  charges.	  
	  
One	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  the	  AKP’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  Gezi	  protests	  was	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  efforts	  to	  bring	  in	  
international	  financial	  actors	  into	  his	  discourse.	  The	  early	  days	  of	  Gezi	  protests	  at	  the	  end	  of	  May	  
2013	  coincided	  with	  what	  is	  now	  called	  the	  Tapering	  Tantrum-­‐	  namely,	  the	  initial	  flight	  of	  capital	  
from	  emerging	  countries	  when	  the	  FED	  signalled	  its	  intention	  to	  finalize	  its	  several	  trillion	  USD	  worth	  
credit	  programme	  on	  the	  US	  economy-­‐	  the	  very	  programme	  that	  underpinned	  the	  existing	  global	  
credit	  glut	  (Eichengreen	  and	  Gupta	  2014).	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  Turkish	  markets	  also	  suffered	  from	  this	  
knee-­‐jerk	  reaction	  of	  international	  investors.	  The	  significant	  losses	  in	  the	  Turkish	  equity	  and	  bond	  
markets	  were	  also	  compounded	  by	  the	  unprecedented	  street	  level	  protests	  against	  the	  AKP	  rule	  and	  
Mr	  Erdogan’s	  uncompromising	  stance.	  Some	  commentators	  even	  talked	  of	  a	  “Turkish	  spring”,	  
inspired	  by	  mass	  protests	  and	  revolts	  in	  North	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Samaan	  2013;	  Taspinar	  
2014).	  Mr	  Erdogan	  not	  only	  dismissed	  the	  protests	  as	  the	  work	  of	  “riff	  raff”	  but	  also	  pointed	  squarely	  
to	  a	  coalition	  of	  international	  conspirators,	  	  including	  what	  Mr	  Erdogan	  calls	  the	  “interest	  lobby”	  
against	  Turkey	  under	  his	  rule	  (Atay	  2013,	  Kilic	  2014).	  	  
	  
The	  interest	  lobby	  basically	  refers	  to	  international	  fixed-­‐income	  investors	  in	  Turkey	  who	  aim	  to	  earn	  
higher	  returns	  on	  their	  exposure	  to	  the	  Turkish	  government’s	  debt.	  In	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  view,	  as	  he	  
voiced	  it	  ever	  more	  strongly	  during	  the	  Gezi	  events,	  this	  lobby	  is	  prone	  to	  destabilize	  Turkey	  by	  
manipulating	  the	  Turkish	  markets	  and	  using	  their	  economic	  power	  for	  political	  ends.	  Mr	  Erdogan	  
used	  this	  term	  in	  previous	  years	  when	  he	  referred	  to	  his	  government’s	  success	  in	  reducing	  the	  
persistently	  high	  inflation	  and	  interest	  rates	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s.	  In	  such	  occasions	  or	  any	  
time	  the	  Turkish	  markets	  suffered	  from	  losses	  because	  of	  local	  or	  international	  reasons,	  Mr	  Erdogan	  
hardly	  associated	  international	  capital	  with	  any	  malign	  intent	  of	  toppling	  a	  democratically	  elected	  
government	  in	  Turkey.	  	  Instead,	  he	  generally	  framed	  international	  capital	  investing	  in	  Turkey	  as	  a	  
force	  that	  appreciated	  strong	  political	  will	  and	  stability	  brought	  by	  the	  AKP	  rule	  and	  his	  leadership.	  
With	  the	  Gezi	  protests	  coinciding	  with	  the	  Tapering	  Tantrum	  and	  leading	  to	  a	  major	  crash	  in	  the	  




Mr	  Erdogan’s	  discursive	  attack	  on	  international	  investors	  actually	  turned	  into	  a	  very	  substantial	  and	  
unprecedented	  regulatory	  investigation	  of	  international	  investors	  and	  Turkish	  brokers	  who	  served	  
them.	  As	  of	  2015,	  there	  has	  been	  no	  official	  declaration	  as	  to	  whether	  such	  a	  lobby,	  intent	  on	  
overthrowing	  the	  government	  by	  economic	  means	  exists	  and	  what	  measures	  would	  be	  taken	  to	  deal	  
with	  it.	  Though	  unofficial,	  the	  Turkish	  market	  regulator	  seems	  to	  have	  basically	  given	  up	  the	  
investigation	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2013	  after	  finding	  no	  meaningful	  evidence	  of	  market	  manipulation.5	  
Despite	  their	  outcome,	  these	  investigations	  have	  given	  Turkish	  and	  international	  finance	  
professionals	  and	  investors	  a	  firm	  message	  that	  they	  are	  being	  watched	  by	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  state	  
apparatus	  for	  what	  they	  advise	  and	  do	  in	  the	  Turkish	  markets.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Views	  from	  Turkish	  markets	  	  
Looking	  at	  the	  contemporary	  market	  cultures	  in	  Turkey,	  one	  can	  expect	  that	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  rhetoric	  
and	  actions	  on	  the	  interest	  lobby	  would	  not	  struggle	  to	  find	  resonance	  and	  support,	  especially	  
among	  the	  Turkish	  retail	  investors.	  Since	  the	  deregulation	  of	  markets	  in	  the	  1980s,	  the	  gradually	  
increasing	  presence	  of	  foreign	  investors	  in	  the	  Turkish	  markets	  has	  engendered	  culturally	  intriguing	  
imaginations	  and	  behaviour	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Turkish	  investors	  figure.	  These	  have	  included	  trading	  
opportunism	  against	  the	  unsuspecting	  foreign	  investors	  in	  the	  form	  of	  fronting	  orders	  –namely,	  
buying	  before	  foreigners	  buy	  and	  then	  selling	  to	  them	  at	  profit.	  Another	  one	  is	  the	  “moustached	  
foreigners”,	  which	  basically	  referred	  to	  Turkish	  investors	  setting	  up	  off-­‐shore	  accounts	  to	  benefit	  
from	  the	  tax	  exemptions	  given	  to	  the	  foreign	  investors	  in	  the	  1990s.	  These	  off-­‐shore	  funds	  were	  
generally	  associated	  with	  notable	  Turkish	  investors	  who	  amassed	  significant	  amount	  of	  financial	  
assets	  and	  day-­‐traded	  in	  the	  markets	  and	  influenced	  market	  values.	  Majority	  of	  market	  actors	  
including	  regulators	  generally	  saw	  this	  type	  of	  activity	  as	  market	  manipulation	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
other	  Turkish	  and	  foreign	  investors	  but	  some	  saw	  it	  as	  unofficial	  market	  making	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  
upholding	  liquidity	  and	  fair	  values	  in	  a	  volatile	  market	  like	  the	  ISE	  (Tarim	  2010).	  	  
	  
After	  the	  2001	  crisis,	  many	  of	  these	  notable	  Turkish	  investors	  lost	  their	  power	  in	  the	  ISE.	  Some	  
finance	  professionals	  close	  to	  these	  investors	  lamented	  the	  lack	  of	  government	  support	  to	  this	  type	  
of	  investor	  and	  associated	  brokerage	  firms	  when	  they	  faced	  financial	  difficulties.	  For	  them,	  this	  
demonstrated	  the	  successive	  Turkish	  governments’	  unabated	  love	  for	  anything	  that	  was	  “Western”.	  
One	  could	  see	  the	  point	  my	  interlocutors	  tried	  to	  make	  as	  in	  the	  post-­‐2001	  structural	  reform	  era	  
there	  had	  been	  a	  great	  international	  investor	  interest	  in	  Turkish	  assets.	  In	  2007,	  the	  share	  of	  the	  
foreign	  investors	  in	  the	  Turkish	  equities	  rose	  to	  72	  %,	  which	  was	  more	  than	  double	  their	  share	  in	  the	  
1990s.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  automation	  and	  digitization	  of	  the	  Turkish	  markets	  also	  meant	  that	  
access	  to	  market	  information	  became	  much	  easier	  than	  ever,	  including	  what	  foreign	  investors	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  According	  to	  undisclosed	  CMB	  sources	  cited	  in	  a	  news	  report	  “Faiz	  Lobisi	  Bulunamadi”	  by	  Hulya	  Guler	  of	  
Hurriyet	  (30	  December	  2013),	  the	  ongoing	  investigation	  was	  not	  expected	  to	  produce	  any	  conclusive	  evidence	  
of	  market	  manipulation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  international	  investors	  and	  their	  Turkish	  brokers.	  The	  news	  	  is	  available	  
at	  http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/25467161.asp	  	  	  (In	  Turkish),	  last	  accessed	  20	  Sep.	  15	  
8	  
	  
doing	  in	  the	  ISE.	  This	  helped	  retail	  investors	  and	  their	  brokers	  generate	  a	  few	  theories	  about	  the	  
foreigners	  and	  their	  manipulation	  of	  the	  Turkish	  markets	  (Tarim	  2009).	  	  
	  
The	  peak	  point	  of	  national	  publicity	  for	  these	  theories	  came	  when	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  was	  to	  
decide	  on	  the	  AKP	  ban	  case	  in	  2008.	  While	  many	  expected	  a	  ban	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  ever	  
powerful	  secular	  establishment,	  this	  did	  not	  happen	  after	  a	  very	  close	  vote	  of	  6	  to	  5	  in	  favour	  of	  
lighter	  penalties	  to	  AKP.	  Many	  investors	  cried	  insider	  information	  leaked	  to	  the	  foreigners	  before	  the	  
decision.	  These	  claims	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  separate	  and	  thorough	  investigation	  by	  the	  regulators.	  They	  
also	  sternly	  dismissed	  these	  manipulation	  claims	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  foreign	  investors	  invariably	  
made	  financial	  decisions	  based	  on	  sound	  economic	  analysis,	  which	  demonstrated	  the	  Turkish	  
economy’s	  strong	  growth	  prospects	  (Tarim	  2012).	  As	  mentioned	  before,	  on	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  and	  AKP’s	  
front,	  markets’	  gyrations	  including	  international	  investors’	  exposure	  to	  the	  Turkish	  markets	  had	  
generally	  been	  a	  rhetorical	  trope	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  great	  AKP’s	  economic	  management	  was	  –	  
when	  markets	  were	  rallying,	  and	  how	  the	  secular	  establishment	  were	  destabilizing	  the	  country	  –	  
when	  markets	  were	  jittery	  about	  uncertainty,	  political	  or	  otherwise.	  	  	  
	  
So	  what	  has	  changed	  since	  the	  summer	  of	  2008	  that	  would	  explain	  not	  only	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  new	  
rhetoric	  about	  international	  investors	  but	  also	  the	  regulators’	  changing	  stance	  against	  them?	  The	  
above	  mentioned	  consolidation	  of	  AKP’s	  and	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  power	  against	  the	  secular	  
establishment’s	  legal	  and	  otherwise	  challenges	  was	  almost	  completed	  in	  2013.	  In	  a	  dramatic	  turn	  of	  
events	  in	  2014,	  Mr	  Erdogan	  saw	  off	  another	  challenge,	  this	  time	  from	  his	  allies	  in	  judiciary	  and	  
police,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  graft	  probes	  on	  his	  then	  cabinet	  ministers.	  As	  a	  response,	  the	  AKP	  government	  
undertook	  a	  major	  uprooting	  of	  the	  state	  cadres	  allegedly	  associated	  with	  Mr	  Fettullah	  Gulen’s	  so-­‐
called	  “Hizmet	  Movement”,	  a	  close	  ally	  of	  Mr	  Erdogan	  during	  the	  secular	  challenges	  in	  previous	  
years	  (Taspinar	  2014).	  
	  
	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  of	  increasingly	  unrivalled	  and	  unchecked	  legislative	  and	  executive	  power	  of	  Mr	  
Erdogan,	  one	  can	  better	  understand	  his	  discourse	  about	  everything	  and	  anything	  ranging	  from	  what	  
is	  wrong	  with	  abortion	  (Atay	  2013),	  to	  why	  higher	  interest	  rates	  lead	  to	  higher	  inflation-­‐	  contrary	  to	  
what	  the	  economics	  science	  theorizes	  and	  generally	  finds	  sound	  long-­‐term	  evidence	  for	  (Mishkin	  
1992).	  As	  Mr	  Erdogan	  is	  now	  the	  first	  elected	  president	  of	  the	  country-­‐	  a	  position	  that	  has	  
constitutionally	  limited	  powers,	  he	  does	  not	  make	  it	  secret	  that	  Turkey	  should	  have	  a	  presidential	  
system	  a	  la	  Turca.	  This	  implies	  de	  facto	  control	  by	  Mr	  Erdogan	  over	  all	  branches	  and	  institutions	  of	  
the	  state.	  This	  includes	  the	  Turkish	  central	  bank,	  which	  has	  enjoyed	  autonomy	  in	  its	  management	  of	  
the	  inflation	  targeting	  monetary	  policy	  since	  2002.	  	  
	  
For	  several	  years	  now,	  the	  central	  bank’s	  interest	  rate	  policy	  has	  attracted	  criticism	  by	  the	  AKP	  
ministers	  and	  Mr	  Erdogan	  for	  being	  too	  high	  to	  sustain	  the	  Turkish	  economic	  growth	  –	  an	  area	  of	  
achievement	  that	  many	  see	  as	  the	  key	  to	  AKP’s	  election	  victories.	  These	  criticisms	  have	  in	  2014	  and	  
2015	  taken	  a	  much	  more	  severe	  form.	  At	  one	  point	  the	  central	  bank	  governor	  and	  his	  very	  few	  
9	  
	  
supporters	  in	  the	  cabinet	  were	  indirectly	  accused	  of	  treason	  by	  Mr	  Erdogan.6	  The	  stalling	  economic	  
growth	  rates,	  down	  to	  less	  than	  3	  %	  from	  a	  republican	  average	  right	  around	  5	  %,	  coupled	  with	  the	  
persistently	  high	  inflation	  must	  have	  been	  a	  worry	  to	  Mr	  Erdogan	  and	  AKP	  as	  their	  electoral	  
performance	  	  in	  successive	  elections	  since	  2002	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  Turkish	  
economy’s	  growth	  and	  employment	  performance	  (Onis	  2012).	  AKP	  is	  now	  facing	  another	  election	  
challenge	  after	  failing	  to	  win	  in	  June	  2015	  a	  majority	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  an	  election	  since	  2002.	  The	  
forthcoming	  re-­‐elections	  are	  very	  important	  for	  the	  Turkish	  president	  because	  if	  AKP	  reaches	  over	  
330	  seats	  out	  of	  550,	  they	  could	  take	  the	  country	  to	  a	  presidential	  system	  referendum	  in	  no	  time.	  
Yet,	  according	  to	  opinion	  polls,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  AKP	  would	  reach	  such	  a	  majority.	  	  
	  
In	  a	  context	  of	  slowing	  economic	  growth,	  high	  inflation	  and	  relatively	  low	  policy	  rates	  set	  by	  the	  
Turkish	  central	  bank,	  the	  Turkish	  assets	  have	  become	  comparatively	  less	  attractive	  to	  international	  
investors.	  One	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  the	  slowdown	  in	  the	  capital	  flows	  to	  Turkey,	  which	  have	  been	  
essential	  to	  balance	  Turkey’s	  persistent	  current	  account	  deficit.	  Moreover,	  the	  FED’s	  impending	  
policy	  rate	  hike	  on	  the	  back	  of	  stronger	  US	  economy	  has	  been	  highly	  anticipated	  in	  global	  financial	  
markets.	  This	  anticipation	  has	  come	  with	  significant	  capital	  flight	  from	  emerging	  countries,	  including	  
Turkey.	  Despite	  these	  unfavourable	  credit	  conditions	  for	  emerging	  countries	  in	  the	  world,	  there	  has	  
been	  no	  significant	  issue	  for	  the	  Turkish	  government	  to	  raise	  capital	  and	  service	  its	  budget	  deficit	  
and	  outstanding	  debt.	  These	  actually	  enjoy	  very	  low	  levels	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  EU	  countries	  (Akin	  
2015).	  The	  post-­‐2001	  structural	  reforms	  in	  Turkey	  and	  AKP’s	  commitment	  to	  them	  have	  finished	  off	  
the	  coupon	  capitalism	  of	  the	  1990s	  in	  Turkey.	  For	  the	  other	  success	  story	  of	  AKP-­‐	  namely,	  the	  start	  
of	  the	  EU	  accession	  negotiations;	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  unfortunately	  frozen	  thanks	  to	  a	  combination	  of	  
old	  and	  new	  factors	  such	  as	  Cyprus	  issue	  and	  rising	  cultural	  and	  political	  opposition	  to	  EU	  
enlargement.	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  increasingly	  authoritarian	  control	  over	  the	  Turkish	  bureaucracy,	  judiciary	  
and	  media	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  help	  Turkey’s	  EU	  cause	  either	  (Akser	  and	  Baybars-­‐Hawks	  2011;	  Taspinar	  
2014).	  
	  
In	  this	  new	  era	  of	  global	  credit	  contraction	  and	  high	  policy	  rates,	  difficulties	  of	  raising	  finance	  are	  
mainly	  expected	  for	  private	  Turkish	  debtors,	  including	  banks	  which	  are	  exposed	  to	  fast	  growing	  
consumer	  credit	  markets	  and	  issue	  of	  consumer	  debt	  in	  Turkey.	  The	  “crazy	  projects”	  are	  also	  
expected	  to	  face	  difficulty	  in	  raising	  credit	  and	  refinancing.	  Interestingly,	  Turkey	  has	  been	  enjoying	  
the	  spectre	  of	  a	  sort	  in	  these	  circumstances	  –	  namely,	  the	  net	  omissions	  and	  errors	  in	  its	  balance	  of	  
payments	  statistics.	  Recently,	  Turkey	  has	  been	  enjoying	  billions	  of	  dollars	  of	  inflows	  of	  the	  sort,	  
which	  cannot	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  specific	  transactions	  such	  as	  exports,	  foreign	  direct	  and/or	  portfolio	  
investment.7In	  the	  meantime,	  Mr	  Erdogan	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  relent	  in	  his	  discursive	  attacks	  on	  the	  
interest	  lobby	  and	  their	  local	  accomplices	  in	  his	  frequent	  and	  televised	  speeches	  to	  various	  
audiences.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Reuters,	  “Turkey's	  Erdogan	  to	  talk	  to	  central	  bank	  governor,	  warns	  of	  'treason'”,	  by	  Daren	  Butler	  and	  Nevzat	  Devranoglu,	  
02	  March	  15,	  available	  at	  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/02/uk-­‐turkey-­‐cenbank-­‐erdogan-­‐
idUKKBN0LY0WT20150302	  ,	  last	  accessed	  19	  Sep.	  15	  
7	  Bloomberg	  Business,	  “Turkey's	  Vanishing	  $8	  Billion.	  No	  one	  knows	  where	  this	  money	  is	  coming	  from”,	  by	  Onur	  Ant,	  	  29	  
Jan.	  2015,	  available	  at	  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-­‐01-­‐29/the-­‐7-­‐9-­‐billion-­‐in-­‐turkey-­‐s-­‐mystery-­‐money-­‐




On	  the	  other	  hand,	  these	  attacks	  seem	  not	  to	  resonate	  with	  Turkish	  retail	  investors	  and	  their	  brokers	  
as	  much	  as	  they	  would	  do	  in	  the	  pre-­‐2008	  period.	  When	  asked	  in	  2014,	  many	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  in	  
the	  Turkish	  retail	  investor	  scene	  were	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  spectre	  that	  has	  helped	  Turkey	  balance	  its	  
books	  in	  this	  recent	  phase	  of	  credit	  contraction	  might	  have	  regularly	  found	  its	  way	  into	  the	  Turkish	  
financial	  markets	  and	  kept	  them	  buoyant	  despite	  the	  lacklustre	  economic	  fundamentals.	  Another	  
view	  about	  this	  spectre	  is	  that	  its	  colour	  is	  green,	  which	  refers	  to	  beliefs	  about	  its	  origins	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East	  among	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  close	  allies.	  As	  for	  foreign	  investors	  in	  the	  ISE,	  according	  to	  industry	  
statistics,	  their	  ownership	  levels	  in	  the	  ISE	  have	  seemed	  to	  ebb	  and	  flow	  around	  a	  62	  %	  and	  67	  %	  
bracket	  between	  2009	  and	  2014,	  after	  their	  peak	  of	  72	  %	  in	  2007.	  8	  While	  these	  movements	  of	  entry	  
and	  exit	  seemed	  to	  coincide	  with	  major	  local	  and	  international	  events	  such	  as	  AKP’s	  election	  
victories,	  Gezi	  Park	  protests,	  and	  relapsing	  Eurozone	  crisis	  ;	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  bracket	  signal	  a	  
dedicated	  foreign	  investor	  base	  that	  have	  a	  continuous	  exposure	  to	  the	  Turkish	  assets.	  
Geographically,	  despite	  recently	  emerging	  market	  chatter	  about	  the	  flow	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  capital	  
to	  the	  Turkish	  economy,	  this	  dedicated	  foreign	  investor	  base,	  according	  to	  industry	  figures,	  	  mainly	  
originate	  from	  North	  America	  and	  Europe.9	  It	  is	  also	  these	  geographical	  regions	  where	  recent	  
political	  interventions	  in	  and	  pressures	  on	  the	  Turkish	  markets	  and	  institutions	  are	  closely	  monitored	  
as	  cues	  for	  a	  potential	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Turkish	  economy.	  	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  state	  of	  progress	  in	  the	  IFCP?	  	  
As	  shown	  above,	  the	  state	  of	  Turkish	  economy	  and	  markets	  have	  been	  closely	  linked	  to	  global	  
economic	  cycles	  and	  local	  political	  dynamics.	  Although	  in	  the	  new	  millennium,	  the	  effect	  of	  politics	  
on	  the	  Turkish	  economy	  seems	  to	  have	  stabilized	  around	  macroeconomic	  reform	  and	  prudence,	  
recent	  political	  events	  in	  Turkey	  have	  given	  cues	  of	  change.	  If	  Mr	  Erdogan	  and	  AKP	  succeed	  in	  their	  
plan	  to	  shift	  to	  a	  presidential	  system,	  this	  hints	  an	  economy	  that	  is	  much	  more	  open	  to	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  
and	  his	  allies’	  influence	  in	  a	  globally	  contracting	  credit	  environment.	  The	  latter	  coupled	  with	  ongoing	  
political	  uncertainty	  in	  Turkey	  might	  have	  contributed	  to	  Istanbul’s	  recent	  drop	  in	  the	  GFCI	  too.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  meantime,	  the	  IFCP’s	  building	  work	  is	  poised	  to	  be	  completed	  in	  several	  years.	  The	  physical	  
heart	  of	  IFCP	  in	  Atasehir,	  built	  by	  a	  contractor	  with	  very	  close	  links	  to	  AKP,	  is	  designed	  as	  not	  only	  a	  
financial	  centre	  but	  also	  a	  residential	  and	  shopping	  area.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  
rationale	  for	  the	  regulators	  and	  state	  owned	  banks	  to	  move	  their	  Ankara	  headquarters	  to	  Atasehir	  in	  
an	  era	  of	  digitization	  and	  instant	  communication.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  ISE	  announced	  that	  it	  will	  stay	  put	  
in	  its	  current	  headquarters	  in	  Istinye,	  situated	  some	  20	  kilometres	  northwest	  of	  the	  IFCP.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  addition	  of	  IFCP	  campus	  to	  Atasehir	  district	  will	  surely	  increase	  the	  property	  values	  
and	  traffic	  loads	  in	  this	  very	  vertical	  and	  popular	  residential	  area	  of	  Istanbul.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  These	  figures	  are	  compiled	  from	  the	  Turkish	  Capital	  Markets	  Association’s	  	  (TCMA)	  annual	  reports	  on	  the	  Turkish	  
markets.	  The	  TCMA’s	  members	  consist	  of	  the	  Turkish	  brokerage	  firms	  and	  banks.	  The	  reports	  (in	  Turkish	  and	  English)	  are	  
accessible	  at	  http://www.tspakb.org.tr/tr/	  	  




Irrespective	  of	  the	  ISE’s	  decision,	  the	  stock	  market	  itself	  has	  recently	  gone	  through	  some	  changes,	  
which	  are	  related	  to	  various	  IFCP	  objectives.	  Now	  called	  Borsa	  Istanbul,	  the	  ISE	  is	  now	  part-­‐owned	  by	  
a	  leading	  US	  exchange	  NASDAQ,	  and	  is	  poised	  to	  be	  privatized	  via	  public	  offering.10	  	  The	  organized	  
markets	  for	  bonds,	  derivatives	  and	  metals,	  some	  of	  which	  operated	  independently	  before	  are	  all	  
brought	  together	  under	  the	  roof	  of	  Borsa	  Istanbul.	  Moreover,	  the	  number	  of	  financial	  instruments	  
traded	  in	  Borsa	  Istanbul	  has	  increased.	  This	  product	  diversification	  provides	  local	  and	  international	  
investors	  better	  opportunities	  to	  manage	  their	  risks	  in	  the	  Turkish	  market.	  Direct	  market	  access	  to	  
investors,	  which	  reduces	  reliance	  on	  brokers	  is	  now	  offered	  by	  Borsa	  Istanbul.	  This	  will	  also	  pave	  way	  
for	  high	  frequency	  trading	  -­‐	  a	  new	  form	  of	  financial	  activity	  that	  is	  increasingly	  becoming	  the	  norm	  in	  
developed	  markets.	  	  
	  
Other	  notable	  developments	  in	  the	  Turkish	  markets	  are	  the	  significant	  growth	  in	  the	  corporate	  bond	  
issuances	  and	  the	  increasing	  investment	  by	  Turkish	  households	  in	  a	  bourgeoning	  private	  pension	  
system,	  made	  very	  attractive	  by	  a	  25	  %	  extra	  state	  contribution	  to	  their	  annual	  savings	  (World	  Bank	  
2012).	  All	  these	  developments	  signal	  deepening	  and	  widening	  of	  the	  Turkish	  markets,	  which	  will	  in	  
the	  long	  run	  make	  these	  markets	  more	  stable	  and	  attractive	  to	  not	  only	  new	  international	  investors	  
but	  also	  Turkish	  savers.	  The	  latter	  group	  on	  average	  prefer	  to	  avoid	  investing	  their	  savings	  into	  
organized	  markets	  and	  instead	  prefer	  bank	  deposits,	  real	  estate,	  gold	  and	  foreign	  currency	  as	  
savings	  vehicles	  (World	  Bank	  2012).	  A	  transformation	  of	  Turkish	  savers	  into	  investors	  in	  the	  Turkish	  
markets	  seems	  to	  be	  essential	  to	  expand	  the	  currently	  negligible	  domestic	  assets	  under	  professional	  
management	  within	  the	  Turkish	  markets.	  Such	  an	  expansionary	  transformation	  will	  also	  make	  
Istanbul	  and	  the	  IFCP	  more	  attractive	  to	  international	  finance	  firms,	  professionals	  and	  investors.	  	  	  
	  
As	  for	  the	  substantial	  reforms	  and	  initiatives	  planned	  in	  legal,	  regulatory,	  technological,	  human	  
resources	  and	  other	  domains	  for	  the	  IFCP,	  some	  of	  these	  will	  surely	  take	  time	  to	  bear	  fruit.	  For	  
instance	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  human	  resources	  where	  a	  workforce	  that	  can	  fulfil	  the	  diverse	  needs	  of	  
global	  economic	  and	  financial	  organisations	  is	  trained	  in	  and/or	  attracted	  to	  Istanbul	  is	  surely	  a	  no	  
easy	  feat	  to	  achieve	  in	  the	  short-­‐run.	  This	  is	  even	  more	  so	  given	  that	  existing	  global	  workforce	  is	  
easily	  attracted	  to	  major	  global	  financial	  centres	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  North	  America	  and	  East	  Asia	  
thanks	  to	  advanced	  technological,	  legal,	  social	  and	  service	  structures	  these	  centres	  are	  embedded	  in	  
(Sassen	  2005).	  The	  alternative	  of	  training	  homegrown	  workforce	  to	  global	  standards	  prevalent	  in	  
major	  global	  hubs	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  will	  surely	  take	  time	  and	  major	  investment	  by	  public	  and	  
private	  agents	  in	  Turkey.	  	  	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  above	  mentioned	  changes	  in	  Borsa	  Istanbul	  in	  terms	  of	  technology,	  product	  
diversity,	  and	  convergence	  to	  global	  market	  standards	  are	  relatively	  easier	  to	  achieve,	  especially	  in	  
cooperation	  with	  global	  partners	  such	  as	  NASDAQ.	  Nevertheless,	  another	  area	  of	  difficulty	  can	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Reuters,	  “Nasdaq	  to	  acquire	  5	  percent	  in	  Borsa	  Istanbul”,	  by	  Can	  Sezer,	  31	  Dec.	  13,	  available	  at	  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/31/us-­‐turkey-­‐stock-­‐nasdaq-­‐idUSBRE9BU05C20131231	  ,	  last	  accessed	  19	  Sep.	  15	  
12	  
	  
expected	  in	  the	  legal	  domain.	  Market	  regulations	  in	  Turkey	  are	  increasingly	  brought	  to	  prevalent	  
standards	  thanks	  to	  the	  autonomy	  of	  Borsa	  Istanbul	  and	  the	  Capital	  Market	  Boards	  of	  Turkey,	  which	  
both	  enjoy	  long-­‐standing	  expertise	  in	  financial	  market	  theory	  and	  practice.	  Nonetheless,	  one	  major	  
obstacle	  before	  the	  effective	  functioning	  of	  Turkish	  markets	  as	  a	  regional	  and/or	  global	  financial	  
centre	  will	  be	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  existing	  Turkish	  commercial,	  tax	  and	  civil	  codes	  with	  evolving	  
Turkish	  markets	  and	  global	  best	  practices	  in	  business	  and	  finance.	  The	  latter	  area	  is	  very	  competitive	  
and	  sometimes	  proves	  controversial	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  balance	  between	  global	  investor	  rights	  and	  
accountability	  and	  transparency	  of	  global	  business	  and	  finance	  in	  national	  contexts.	  A	  strong	  and	  
consensual	  political	  will	  is	  necessary	  to	  bring	  the	  existing	  codes	  and	  the	  1982	  constitution	  itself	  to	  
the	  written	  and	  practical	  standards	  widely	  held	  in	  the	  West,	  which	  also	  happens	  to	  host	  most	  of	  the	  
global	  financial	  centres.	  Given	  the	  current	  impasse	  of	  the	  Turkish	  politics	  revolving	  around	  Mr	  
Erdogan’s	  ambition	  to	  shift	  the	  country	  to	  a	  presidential	  system,	  any	  comprehensive	  reform	  on	  any	  
parts	  or	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Turkish	  legal	  system	  seems	  highly	  unlikely,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short	  run.	  	  
	  
Given	  these	  mixed	  dynamics	  over	  the	  future	  of	  the	  IFCP,	  one	  peculiar	  objective	  of	  this	  project	  should	  
be	  noted	  here,	  namely	  that	  of	  making	  Istanbul	  a	  major	  centre	  for	  Islamic	  banking	  and	  finance	  in	  the	  
world.11	  In	  the	  IFCP	  website,	  the	  exact	  term	  used	  for	  this	  type	  of	  banking	  is	  “participatory	  banking	  
and	  interest	  rate	  free	  finance”,	  perhaps	  not	  to	  evoke	  suspicions	  from	  secular-­‐minded	  observers.	  
There	  are	  several	  such	  banks,	  operating	  in	  Turkey	  for	  several	  decades	  now.	  	  Nevertheless,	  for	  such	  
banking	  and	  financial	  services	  from	  the	  IFCP	  to	  be	  competitive	  in	  a	  fast	  populated	  regional	  and	  
global	  market,	  an	  internationally	  recognized	  fatwa	  board	  issuing	  orders	  for	  complex	  needs	  of	  Islamic	  
finance	  users	  might	  be	  essential	  (Valdez	  and	  Molyneux	  2013).	  Some	  of	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  close	  allies	  
have	  long	  advocated	  the	  necessity	  of	  such	  a	  fatwa	  board	  to	  expand	  the	  reach	  of	  Turkish	  markets	  
nationally	  and	  regionally.12	  In	  fact,	  the	  current	  chairman	  of	  the	  board	  of	  Borsa	  Istanbul,	  a	  recent	  AKP	  
government	  appointee	  has	  remarked	  that	  stock	  markets	  should	  become	  a	  platform	  where	  Islamic	  
finance	  principals	  should	  prevail	  across	  all	  markets	  and	  instruments	  instead	  of	  only	  offering	  some	  
sharia-­‐complaint	  products.	  13	  Such	  remarks	  and	  visions	  for	  the	  future	  of	  Borsa	  Istanbul	  and	  the	  ICFP	  
are	  probably	  also	  close	  to	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  heart.	  Nevertheless,	  such	  a	  vision	  also	  significantly	  narrows	  
the	  geographical	  target	  in	  relation	  to	  future	  users	  of	  the	  IFCP,	  away	  from	  a	  global	  user	  base	  involved	  
in	  mainstream	  banking	  and	  finance.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  	  
This	  article	  attempted	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  links	  between	  national	  and	  global	  dynamics	  that	  have	  
combined	  to	  pave	  way	  for	  the	  AKP’s	  rise	  and	  transforming	  rule	  in	  Turkey.	  The	  IFCP	  has	  some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  See	  footnote	  1	  
12	  The	  most	  prominent	  example	  is	  Mr	  Yigit	  Bulut,	  previously	  a	  staunch	  critique	  of	  Mr	  Erdogan	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  AKP	  and	  
now	  a	  presidential	  economic	  advisor.	  In	  a	  column	  he	  wrote	  for	  Star	  Gazetesi	  on	  19	  Aug.	  15,	  he	  reiterated	  his	  “fatwa	  vision”	  
for	  Islamic	  finance	  in	  Turkey.	  The	  column	  is	  available	  in	  Turkish	  at	  http://haber.star.com.tr/yazar/ic-­‐piyasalarda-­‐10-­‐kat-­‐
fazla-­‐varligimiz-­‐var/yazi-­‐1050998	  ,	  last	  accessed	  19	  Sep.	  15	  
13	  Hurriyet	  Daily	  News,	  	  “Borsa	  Istanbul	  chair	  says	  all	  stocks	  exchanges	  should	  be	  run	  in	  Islamic	  way”	  10	  Sep.	  15	  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/borsa-­‐istanbul-­‐chair-­‐says-­‐all-­‐stocks-­‐exchanges-­‐should-­‐be-­‐run-­‐in-­‐islamic-­‐




commendable	  and	  much	  needed	  objectives	  to	  expand	  the	  current	  scope	  and	  reach	  of	  financial	  
markets	  in	  Turkey.	  Nevertheless,	  without	  progress	  in	  macro	  level	  reforms	  and	  initiatives	  necessary	  
to	  reach	  such	  objectives,	  the	  IFCP	  will	  remain	  as	  one	  of	  the	  many	  infrastructure	  and	  building	  projects	  
that	  Mr	  Erdogan	  and	  his	  AKP	  government	  have	  pushed	  for	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  global	  credit	  glut.	  
Current	  political	  dynamics	  in	  Turkey	  squarely	  point	  to	  an	  impasse	  around	  Mr	  Erdogan’s	  rather	  
authoritarian	  presidential	  vision	  for	  Turkey.	  The	  deterioration	  in	  political	  stability	  and	  certainty,	  
coupled	  with	  the	  gradual	  reversal	  in	  global	  credit	  conditions	  has	  underpinned	  the	  slowdown	  and	  
capital	  flight	  in	  the	  Turkish	  economy.	  Despite	  the	  perceived	  influence	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  capital	  and	  
politics	  in	  Turkey	  in	  recent	  years,	  market	  statistics	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  dominance	  by	  a	  dedicated	  
Western	  investor	  base,	  at	  least	  in	  Borsa	  Istanbul.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Mr	  Erdogan	  and	  his	  supporters	  
in	  bureaucracy,	  business	  and	  media	  seem	  to	  be	  seeing	  solutions	  in	  a	  gradual	  cultural,	  political	  and	  
economic	  turn	  to	  Turkey’s	  eastern	  hinterland.	  Such	  a	  political	  preference	  also	  hints	  at	  certain	  
trajectories	  for	  not	  only	  the	  IFCP	  but	  also	  the	  Turkish	  economy.	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